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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background of the study 
Stock price crashes cause major concerns for active investors and have a disastrous influence 
on investor welfare (Ak et al. 2016; Kim & Zhang 2016). Further, stock price crashes are 
not unusual. Accumulated stock returns are found to be asymmetrically distributed, and one 
of the indications of this phenomenon is that stocks are more prone to large negative returns 
than to large positive ones (Campbell & Hentschel 1992; Chen et al. 2001). Hutton et al. 
(2009) find in their cross-industry study covering the period from 1991 to 2005 that 17.1% 
of the sample companies experienced at least one crash per year. 
In the 21st century, there has been a growing interest in stock price crash risk among 
academic literature (e.g. Chen et al. 2001; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011a; Kim et al. 
2011b; An & Zhang 2013; Kim et al. 2014; Callen & Fang 2015; Ak et al. 2016; Chen et al. 
2017). The prior literature focuses on searching cross-industry wide determinants for crash 
risk. Studies find that firm-specific stock price crash risk is positively associated with 
accounting opacity (Hutton et al. 2009), corporate tax avoidance (Kim et al. 2011a), short 
interest (Callen & Fang 2015), real earnings management (Francis et al. 2016), CEO 
overconfidence (Kim et al. 2016) and earnings smoothing (Chen et al. 2017), and negatively 
associated with corporate social responsibility (Kim et al. 2014) and accounting 
conservatism (Kim & Zhang 2016). 
While a recent cross-industry study shows that earnings announcements trigger 
approximately 70% of all stock price crashes (Ak et al. 2016), in biotechnology industry 
reported earnings have nearly immaterial impact on share prices (Ely et al. 2003; Dedman 
et al. 2008). Biotechnology industry is a research-intensive sector with long development 
lead times, extensive capital requirements, and complex intellectual property right matters 
(Hamill et al. 2013). Product development is in the central role of this highly regulated 
industry, where all the firms must go through and pass the same development stages defined 
by the regulator (Girotra et al. 2007). To succeed companies need to continuously develop 
new products since the treatment of diseases is constantly changing and patent expirations 
increase the competition and reduce the margins of products (Shortridge 2004). Under U.S. 
GAAP accounting standards, internal research and development costs should be expensed 
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when incurred pursuant to SFAS 2. Therefore, reported earnings for biotechnology firms 
may be less informative for investors in respect to firm value compared to less research-
intensive industries (Dedman et al. 2008). Despite the complex nature of biotechnology 
sector that differs from many other industries and the significance of stock price crashes, 
there is little, if any, empirical evidence of determinants of crash risk in this sector. This 
paper sheds some light on the issue of how investors can avoid value-destroying stock price 
crashes in the complex biotechnology industry. 
1.2. Research objectives 
This study examines determinants of stock price crashes in the U.S. biotechnology sector. 
There is one main objective and one secondary objectives for this thesis. As the main 
objective, the thesis aims to analyse whether it is possible to forecast stock price crashes in 
biotechnology sector using a set of variables, and which of those variables are most 
prominent to predict future crashes. All the predictors are measured on the basis of 
information available to the investors before the occurrence of the stock price crash. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study to investigate crash risk in the biotechnology sector. 
Further, most of the crash risk studies focus on investigating single determinants of crash 
risk rather than a set of possible predictors for crash risk. The only exception I am aware of 
is a recent study of Ak et al. (2016). 
The secondary objective of this study is to increase understanding of how well the metrics 
are classifying stock price crashes. Especially, the aim is to find out how well the metrics 
are agreeing with each other which sample periods undergo crashes and which do not. Two 
crash risk metrics introduced by prior literature (the metrics of Chen et al. 2001 and Ak et 
al. 2016) have remarkably different definitions for a stock price crash. Hence, it is expected 
that those metrics have differences in classification of crashes. To my knowledge, the prior 
literature, however, has not considered the accuracy of different crash measures or compared 
the firm-specific classifications of stock price crashes with different metrics. 
Further, an additional goal of this study is to create a new crash risk metric that answers to 
some of the limitations of existing metrics. The academic literature uses mainly two crash 
risk metrics (the metrics of Chen et al. 2001 and Hutton et al. 2009), which a recent study of 
Ak et al. (2016) has criticized. Thus, this thesis aims to provide a new alternative or 
additional measure that would better identify crashes from large samples. 
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The study is conducted as quantitative analysis applying both logistic and multiple 
regression to explore the predictive power of a set of variables to forecast crash risk. The 
crash metric of Chen et al. (2001) and Ak et al. (2016) are used in this study, as well as an 
additional crash measure. To identify predictors for crash risk, the study tests the relation 
between stock price crash metrics and ten explanatory variables, which are chosen to be 
considered in this study based on the previous literature. The final sample includes 1303 
observations covering the period from 2002 to 2016. The sample consists of U.S. 
biotechnology companies that are in the business of developing new drugs (SIC 2833-2836). 
In this study three different crash risk metrics are used, and hence there are three different 
definition for a stock price crash as well. Chen et al. (2001) define a crash as negative 
skewness in stock return distribution, whereas Ak et al. (2016) define a stock price crash as 
an abnormally large and sudden drop in the price of a stock. The new metric created as part 
of this study defines a stock price crash as a large and sudden drop in the price of a stock 
that remains at the lower level at least for a week. Existing academic literature uses also 
some other crash risk metrics but those are left out of the scope of this study.  
The study focuses on investigating the ability of limited set of explanatory variable to predict 
future stock price crashes in the biotechnology sector. Thus, the selected explanatory 
variables might not be the best predictors for stock price crashes and there might be other 
determinants for crash risk that are out of the scope of this study. The study is limited to the 
biotechnology sector that includes both pharmaceutical and pure-play biotechnology 
companies that are in the business of developing drugs, and hence cannot be directly adapted 
to other industries. This study contributes to the academic literature by increasing the 
understanding of crash risk determinants in the biotechnology sector. 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of six chapters. After introduction, the second chapter reviews the 
literature on stock price crashes. In third chapter the reader is familiarized with the drug 
development process that is in the central role of biotechnology sector. Further, literature 
from the biotechnology sector related to market valuations and stock prices is presented. 
Chapter four introduces the three stock price crash metrics used in this study, describes the 
data and sample, and presents the independent variables used in the regression models. 
Research findings are presented in chapter five, started by introducing the descriptive 
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statistics and correlations of variables, and examining crash classification consistency 
between the three crash metrics. This is followed by presenting the regression analysis 
results for each crash measure, as well as the results for four sensitivity analyses. Finally, 
chapter six summarizes and concludes the research, and makes suggestions for future 
research.  
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2. Stock price crashes 
Stock price crashes are abnormally large and sudden drops in the price of a stock (Ak et al. 
2016). In other words, stock price crashes are large, negative, firms-specific and market-
adjusted return outliers (Jin and Myers 2006). They cause major concerns for active investors 
and have a harmful influence on investor welfare (Ak et al. 2016; Kim & Zhang 2016). Over 
the last decade cross-industry wide determinants of crash risk has been extensively discussed 
in academic literature (e.g. Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011a; Kim et al. 2011b; Kim et 
al. 2014; Callen & Fang 2015; Ak et al. 2016; Francis et al. 2016; Kim et al. 2016; Kim & 
Zhang 2016; Chen et al. 2017). 
A recent study of Ak et al. (2016) investigates factors causing stock price crashes by 
analysing news reports simultaneous with large crashes (i.e. top 5% in the distribution of 
used crash metrics) covering a period from July 2012 to June 2014. They find that 67.9 
percent of stock price crashes are caused by earnings announcements. The second most 
common event causing crashes is earning preannouncement by 9.9%. Hence, according to 
their study, together 77.8% of crashes are earnings-related. Ak et al. (2016) highlight that, 
besides the earnings-related causes, the only other major category explaining crashes is 
‘other firm announcements’, accounting for 9.3% of crashes, from which majority are 
biotechnology firms’ bad news related to clinical trials of new drugs. Taking into 
consideration that the study has a cross-industry sample, such a substantial proportion 
indicates high importance of clinical trial success in the market valuation of biotechnology 
companies. 
The prior studies find several individual determinants of stock price crashes. In many cases 
the underlying explanation for stock price crashes is related to managers’ intentional 
information management, especially to bad news hoarding (e.g. Jin & Myers 2006; Hutton 
et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011a; Kim et al. 2011b; Callen & Fang 2015; Kim et al. 2016). 
Managers tend to hide bad news hoping that those would be temporary. Once a certain 
threshold is reached, this behaviour leads to an abrupt release of an accumulated negative 
information, resulting in a stock price crash (Jin & Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 2009). 
One of the enabling factor for bad news hoarding is tax avoidance, which provides tools and 
mask for managerial opportunistic behaviour leading to higher crash risk (Kim et al. 2011a). 
The study covering sample of U.S. firms for the period from 1995 to 2008 provides evidence 
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that tax avoidance has statistically significant and positive association with the future stock 
price crash risk. Kim et al. (2011a) show, however, that, firms with stronger external 
monitoring have less pronounced relation between tax avoidance and crash risk. 
Weak monitoring of investors is also suggested to increase crash risk and exacerbate bad 
news hoarding behaviour. An and Zhang (2013) find that transient institutional investors, 
which have high portfolio turnover and small positions in individual firms, are associated 
with higher crash risk whereas dedicated institutional investors, which have stable 
ownerships and large positions in companies, are associated with lower crash risk. The 
authors propose that weak monitoring of transient investors allow managers to hide bad 
news, leading to a stock price crash.  
In the firms with weak external monitoring by institutional investors or weak internal 
monitoring by the board, corporate social responsibility (CSR) plays an important role in 
reducing stock price crash risk (Kim et al. 2014). Further, in firms with less effective 
corporate governance or lower level of long-term institutional ownership, CSR is negatively 
associated with crash risk. Kim et al. (2014) suggest that a strong CSR-oriented corporate 
culture mitigates the managers’ bad news hoarding behaviour, resulting in lower stock price 
crash risk.1 Chen et al. (2017) contribute to the study finding that bad CRS firms smooth 
earnings to hide bad news increasing the crash risk of the stock, whereas good CRS firms 
tend not to smooth earnings.  
Chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence can appear in bad news hoarding behaviour 
(Kim et al. 2016). The tendency of some managers to overestimate their own excellence and 
the prospects of positive future outcomes serve as a complementary theory for bad news 
hording and resulting in stock price crashes. Overconfidence can lead the CEO to proceed 
with negative NPV projects and hide the bad performance leading to a stock price crash. 
More conservative accounting policies mitigate the relation between CEO overconfidence 
and future crash risk, indicating the possibility of investors to recognize bad news earlier. 
                                                     
 
1 A circumstance worth noticing is that Kim et al. (2014) define a crash as the conditional skewness 
of return distribution following Chen et al. (2001), rather than an extreme and sudden negative return 
of a stock. While many studies utilize the skewness measure of Chen et al. (2001) in crash risk 
research, they often include as well a crash measure of Hutton et al. (2009), which focus on the large, 
negative returns irrespective of the relation between negative and positive returns. Thus, using only 
the skewness measure narrows down the definition of a stock price crash. 
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Kim and Zhang (2016) argue that greater conditional conservatism is related to lower future 
stock price crash risk. Conditional conservatism refers to the propensity to require less 
evidence to recognize bad news as losses than to recognize good news as gains (Basu 1997). 
Chen et al. (2017) find supporting evidence about the negative association between 
accounting conservatism and crash risk. The findings of Kim and Zhang (2016) hold also to 
changes in the degree of conditional conservatism that are consistently negatively associated 
with changes in future crash risk. The authors suggest that conditional conservatism 
decreases the managers’ ability to hide bad news leading to a smaller stock price crash risk.  
In an environment with higher information asymmetries (i.e. less information is available to 
investors), the predictive power of conditional conservatism over crash risk is greater (Kim 
& Zhang 2016). The predictive power is especially stronger for firms with intensive research 
and development, high industry concentration and low analyst coverage. Kim et al. (2011a) 
and Chen et al. (2017) find a consistent outcome considering the mitigating effect of analyst 
coverage to future crash risk. 
Utilizing the bad news hoarding theory, Jin and Myers (2006) and Hutton et al. (2009) show 
that the lack of information transparency increase future stock price crash risk. Jin and Myers 
(2006) argue that stock price crashes are more common for firms in opaque countries, 
referring to countries where information availability to investors is diminished. Similarly, 
Hutton et al. (2009) find that opacity, measured as accrual-based earnings management, 
predicts crash risk. Accrual-based earnings management refers to use of judgment in 
financial reporting altering the levels of discretionary accruals. Thus, using earnings 
management firms are able to hoard bad news, which can eventually lead to a stock price 
crash. 
Hutton et al. (2009) find in their time-series analysis that the relation between opacity and 
crash risk has diminished in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period. Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act is a United States federal law, which was enacted in 2002 as a response to number of 
major corporate and accounting scandals such as Enron Corporation, Tyco International plc 
and WorldCom. After the passage of SOX, the level of accrual-based earnings management 
has declined significantly, and at the same time the level of real earnings management 
activities have increased significantly (Cohen et al. 2008; Francis et al. 2016). Consistent 
with a survey and field interview study of Graham et al. (2005), the results of Cohen et al. 
(2008) and Francis et al. (2016) suggest that firms have switched from using accrual-based 
  8 
earnings management to real earnings management. In other words, firms have switched 
from using accounting actions (i.e. altering the level of discretionary items) to real actions 
such as delaying maintenance or adjusting R&D expenses to meet short-term earnings 
benchmarks. Consistently, Francis et al. (2016) show that firm’s deviation in real operations 
from industry norms increases crash risk. The association is especially strong in firms using 
real operations for earnings manipulation purposes. 
A recent study of Chen et al. (2017) shows that earnings smoothing is associated with greater 
likelihood of stock price crashes, suggesting that earnings smoothing is detrimental to 
shareholders and can potentially destroy shareholder wealth if the crash risk is realized. The 
authors suggest that earnings smoothing demonstrates managerial opportunism in financial 
reporting, especially, through bad news hoarding behaviour. Managers hide poor 
performance in the hope of better performance in the future. Consistently, earnings 
smoothing and positive discretionary accruals together are associated with more pronounced 
crash risk. Further, the authors find that better analyst coverage, higher institutional holdings 
and good corporate social responsibility of the firm mitigate the stock price crash risk in the 
presence of earnings smoothing. 
Callen and Fang (2015) provide evidence that short interest is positively associated with 
future crash risk. Short interest describes number of shares sold short in relation to the total 
number of shares outstanding. The authors suggest that short sellers are able to recognize 
managers’ bad news hoarding behaviour in firms whose stock they short sell in anticipation 
of stock price crashes. Callen and Fang (2015) find that the association between short selling 
and crash risk is more pronounced in firms that have weaker external monitoring mechanism, 
excessive risk-taking behaviour, and higher level of information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders. 
In the field of crash risk research a well-known paper of Chen et al. (2001) studies crashes 
as conditional skewness of the stock return distribution. Chen et al. (2001) point out that 
they are not trying to forecast negative expected returns due to the narrow definition of stock 
price crashes they have adopted. Yet, the definition has been criticized since skewness of 
stock return can be either caused by negative long tail effect (i.e. extreme negative returns) 
or negative fat tail effect (i.e. multiple small negative returns) (Ak et al. 2016). Further, 
skewness as a measure of crash risk doesn’t capture extreme negative outcomes which occur 
in a period where both extreme negative and extreme positive outcomes are present and 
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therefore returns in the period are normally distributed. Nevertheless, the skewness measure 
of Chen et al. (2001) is widely used in a crash risk literature (e.g. Kim et al. 2011a; Ak et al. 
2016; Francis et al. 2016; Kim & Zhang 2016; Kim et al. 2016; Chen et al. 2017). 
The conditional skewness research of Chen et al. (2001) shows that crash risk is more 
prominent in firms (1) which past returns have been positive over the prior 36 months, (2) 
that have glamour stocks (i.e. book-to-market ratio of the stocks is low), (3) that have 
experienced larger trading volume relative to market trend in the prior six months, and (4) 
that have larger market capitalization. Chen et al. (2001) suggest that larger market 
capitalization firms are more negatively skewed since they are not able to hide bad news 
from market as easily as smaller market capitalization firms. This suggestion is contradictory 
to several crash risk studies utilizing bad news hoarding theory as the explanation for their 
findings. The studies suggest that crashes occur due to the bad news hoarding behaviour. 
Managers tend to hide bad news and once certain threshold is reached the accumulated bad 
news are released to the market leading to a stock price crash. Thus, according to the theory 
if larger market capitalization firms are not able to hide bad news as easily, those should be 
less crash prone firms than smaller market capitalization firms.  
However, Chen et al. (2001) investigate conditional skewness of returns which might result 
also from fat left side tail as explained earlier. Hence, the reasoning behind the connection 
of the market capitalization and skewness can be intuitively accurate if skewness is caused 
by number of small negative returns. As Chen et al. (2001) argue, managers tend to publish 
good news immediately and simultaneously hide bad news that might lead to positive 
skewness before more bad news accumulate and stock price eventually crashes. 
The research of Ak et al. (2016) is one of the only studies trying to identify a set of crash 
predictors instead of identifying single characteristics that forecast stock price crashes. They 
find five explanatory variables that are associated with future crash risk: abnormally high 
trading volume, book-to-market ratio, accounting opacity, short interest (referring to the 
number of shares sold short), and forecasted sales growth. First, abnormally high trading 
volume has a positive relation with crash risk, indicating that disagreements among investors 
increase the future crash risk. Second, consistent with Chen et al. (2001), book-to-market 
ratio is negatively associated with future crash risk.  
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Third, Ak et al. (2016) find that accounting opacity has positive relation with crash risk, 
indicating that the use of subjective assumptions in accounting is related to higher likelihood 
of crashes. The finding is consistent with the study of Hutton et al. (2009), which introduces 
the connection between accounting opacity and crash risk. Fourth, short interest has positive 
association with future crash risk. Short sellers are typically experienced investors 
specialized to distinguish overpriced stocks implying that higher short interest reflects the 
short sellers’ negative view of the stock. Callen and Fang (2015) find consistent connection 
between short interest and future crash risk. Finally, Ak et al. (2016) show that forecasted 
sales growth is positively related to the future crash risk, suggesting that the optimistic 
expectations of sell-side analysts is related to higher likelihood of future crashes.  
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3. Biotechnology sector 
Biotechnology is a collection of techniques that use living cells to develop products such as 
drugs, food products and chemicals (Hand 2001). Both traditional pharmaceutical firms and 
pure-play biotechnology firms perform biotechnology research, however, pharmaceutical 
firms can also develop and manufacture drugs using non-biotech techniques (Ely et al. 
2003). In this study, biotechnology term is used to describe both pharmaceutical firms and 
biotechnology firms, which are in the business of drug development and hence, leave out 
other areas of biotechnology. Further, in this study biotech and biopharmaceutical terms are 
used as synonyms for biotechnology. This chapter start by introducing the drug development 
process in the U.S. followed by reviewing literature about drug development failures and 
market valuation of stocks in biotechnology sector. 
3.1. Drug development process in the U.S. 
Drug development and approval process can be divided into five stages.2 First is discovery 
and development stage where new molecular compounds are being tested to find new 
potential drugs. Second stage is called as preclinical research. Drugs go through laboratory 
and animal testing to examine safety and possible toxicity of the drug. Only one out of 1000 
molecular compounds passes the preclinical testing, which takes on average 3.5 years 
(Dedman et al. 2008).  
On the third stage, called as clinical research, drugs are tested on people to ensure safety and 
effectiveness of the drug. The clinical research is divided into three phases. In phase I, drug 
is examined with 20-100 volunteers to determine the most frequent side effects. The phase 
can take several months and approximately 70% of drugs pass the trial. In phase II, up to 
several hundred patients with the disease or condition participate the trial that takes from 
several months to two years. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reports that in 
this phase on average every third drug moves to the next phase. The third and last phase of 
clinical research include from 300 to 3000 participants who have the disease or condition. 
                                                     
 
2 The approval process can be found from the web page of FDA: 
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/default.htm 
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The trial takes usually from one to four years, and approximately 25-30% of drugs pass the 
phase.  
After the clinical trials, on fourth stage, a drug developer files an application called New 
Drug Application (NDA) which must contain all the essential data of the drug. If the 
application is complete, FDA review team has from 6 to 10 months to decide whether to 
approve the drug. However, Dedman et al. (2008) argue that in almost all cases FDA 
approval exceeds that limit, and it takes approximately 2.5 years for FDA to review the 
NDA. A more recent study of Hamill et al. (2013) reports that the review process takes on 
average 540 days (≈1.5 years). In the last stage, once a drug gets to the market, the firm is 
obligated to submit periodic safety updates to FDA in case of unexpected adverse events.  
The overall drug approval percentage from clinical trials (i.e. drugs that enter clinical trials 
and will eventually be approved) reported by FDA seems to be more conservative than the 
estimates of recent studies. According to FDA, the clinical trial success rate is approximately 
6-7%3 while DiMasi et al. (2016) estimate the rate to be on average 11.83%. An earlier study 
of DiMasi et al. (2003) estimates the clinical trial success rate to be 21.5%, which is nearly 
10 percentage point larger than in the authors’ more recent study. 
Totally the drug development process from discovery to market approval of a new drug takes 
approximately 12 years (Dedman et al. 2008), and costs around 2558 million U.S. dollars 
(DiMasi et al. 2016). The cost represents an average capitalized R&D cost per new approved 
drug for pharmaceutical companies including the costs of abandoned compounds. The earlier 
study of DiMasi et al. (2003), using a consistent methodology, has found that the average 
cost of a new drug was 802 million U.S. dollars in 2000. DiMasi et al. (2016) suggest that 
the increases in costs are driven by growth in the real out-of-pocket costs of development 
and by lower success rates for clinical trials. Comparing pharmaceutical companies to pure-
play biotechnology companies DiMasi and Grabowski (2007) find that the average 
development cost and time for a new drug are relatively similar for these two types of 
companies. 
                                                     
 
3 The clinical trial success rate is calculated using approval rates that FDA has reported for each 
clinical research phase: 70%, 33% and 25-30%. Note that the third phase success rate includes also 
an approval of FDA review stage during which New Drug Application is either approved or rejected.  
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3.2. Drug development failures 
Drug development failures are negatively affecting the market valuation of the firm and thus, 
the shareholder wealth (e.g. Sharma & Lacey 2004; Girotra et al. 2007). However, the 
consequences of drug development failures to a firm’s market value are dependent on the 
stage of the drug development process. In early stages, not only firms are disclosing less 
information of drug development but also investors are not reacting as strongly to the news 
as in later stages of the process (Ely et al. 2003; Dedman et al. 2008). Especially later stage 
announcements that are made after the completion of clinical trial’s phase II are causing 
much stronger market reaction than early stage drug development announcements (Dedman 
et al. 2008). In the later stage of the drug development process investors begin to treat 
research and development costs as probable future revenue-generating assets, and hence the 
declines in share prices are larger when bad news reach the market (Ely et al. 2003). 
The event study analysis of 41 New Drug Application rejections by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration shows that negative announcements of drug development outcomes are 
greatly affecting to the firm’s value (Sharma & Lacey 2004). On the event day of product 
development failure (i.e. the day a firm disclosed the decision of FDA to reject a drug) 
abnormal returns declined on average 11%, and in a three-day window (from a day before 
the event to a day after the event) cumulative abnormal returns declined on average 21%. 
NDA rejections are causing large and abrupt drops in stock prices that, given a broad 
definition (e.g. Ak et al. 2016), can be called as stock price crashes. 
While effects of NDA rejections are massive (21% decline in a 3-day window), Girotra et 
al. (2007) find that a phase III drug failure causes on average 1.46% decline in stock price 
during a seven-day event window (from day -2 to day 4). The effect of NDA rejection is 
particularly strong because it indicates managerial failure in implementing internal controls 
and procedures to ensure drug safety (Girotra et al. 2007). 
Unlike New Drug Application approvals, FDA does not disclose its decision to delay or 
reject an application (Sharma & Lacey 2004). Thus, companies can decide whether they 
disclose the bad news about FDA’s concerns and rejection decisions. Sharma and Lacey 
(2004) argue that due to potentially large reputational and legal costs firms are likely to 
release the bad news related to NDA. On the contrary, Dedman et al. (2008) find that 
companies are disclosing considerably more good news than bad news even though the 
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probabilities to success in a drug development process is low. From the sample of 234 
announcements only twelve were classified as bad news, comprising only 5% of the sample. 
Considering that only one out of 5000 drugs that undergo preclinical testing is approved to 
the market (Dedman et al. 2008), the amount of negative news is remarkably low. The 
existing cross-industry literature of stock price crash risk proposes that bad news hoarding 
is notable reason for increased crash risk (e.g. Jin & Myers 2006; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et 
al. 2011a; Callen & Fang 2015; Kim et al. 2016), which indicates that also in biotechnology 
industry stockpiling bad news, such as drug development failures, can lead to a stock price 
crash.  
3.3. Market valuation of a stock in the biotechnology sector 
While in cross-industry studies earnings announcements are found to be impacting on the 
market value of a company (e.g. Ak et al. 2016), in the biotechnology sector earnings 
announcements do not have a significant explanatory power on share prices (Ely et al. 2003; 
Dedman et al. 2008). In the research-intensive biotechnology sector drug development 
announcements are impacting much stronger on share prices than earnings announcements 
or any other type of announcements (Dedman et al. 2008). Consistently, Hamill et al. (2013) 
state that drug development announcements at various stages are key value drivers for 
biopharmaceutical firms. Other non-financial measures that are significantly associated with 
the share price of a firm include for examples the number of drugs a firm has in clinical trials 
and the number of New Drug Applications submitted to FDA (Ely et al. 3003). 
Even though many studies empathize the impact of non-financial indicators on the market 
value of biotech firms, Ely et al. (2003) argue that financial measures have independent and 
significant explanatory power over the market value. Their core sample consists of 83 pure-
play biotech firms with no approved drugs including 193 firm-year observations over the 
period from 1988 to 1998. Firms without approved drugs are typically younger and smaller, 
and their current earnings are not likely to reflect the future potential of the firm. Ely et al. 
(2003) find that even though earnings are not significantly related to share price, book value 
and research and development expenses account for 68% of the variation in the market value 
of a pure-play biotechnology firm. However, the explanatory power of research and 
development expenses is larger for sample firms with a high-potential portfolio of drugs than 
for low-potential drug portfolios (82% versus 70%). This is in line with Shortridge’s study 
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(2004) stating that non-financial measures complement the mandatory financial information. 
Other key financial indicators for biopharmaceutical firms include retained cash, rate of cash 
expenditure, ‘burn-rate’ (i.e. how quickly a firm uses its shareholder capital), and the timing 
and source of additional capital requirements (Hamill et al. 2013). 
The result of Ely et al. (2003) is also supported by findings of Amir and Lev (1996) who 
research value-relevance of financial information in telecommunication industry, and 
conduct supporting analysis from biotechnology industry. They discover that book values 
are positively associated to share prices while earnings are negatively associated to share 
prices in biotech firms. Due to the irrational negative relation between earnings and share 
prices they suggest that in biotechnology sector the reported earnings are inadequate, and 
provide only little value-relevance to investors.  
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4. Research design 
In this chapter the research design is introduced in three stages. In the first stage, three 
different metrics are presented to define and identify stock price crashes. Further, limitations 
of the metrics are discussed. In the second stage, the data and sample are described, and the 
data modifications are presented. In the last stage, the independent variables are described 
and the choice of the variables is reasoned.  
4.1. Stock price crash metrics 
Prior research uses primarily two different stock price crash metrics: skewness measure of 
Chen et al. (2001) and crash likelihood measure of Hutton et al. (2009).4 Firstly, Chen et al. 
(2001) measure crashes in respect of negative skewness of the stock return distribution. The 
measure for negative coefficient of skewness (NCSKEW) is calculated by dividing the 
negative of daily return skewness with the standard deviation of daily returns raised to the 
third power: 
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = −
𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
3
2∑𝑅𝑖,𝑡
3
(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)(∑𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 )
3
2
 (1) 
 
where Ri,t is the sequence of daily market-adjusted returns to stock i during period t, and n 
is the number of available observations on daily stock returns during the period. However, 
as this study is focused on pharmaceutical industry and Chen et al. (2001) conduct a cross-
industry study, instead of using market-adjusted stock returns, biotechnology industry-
adjusted returns are used. Dividing the raw skewness with the cubed standard deviation 
allows the comparison across stocks with different variances (Chen et al. 2001). 
NCSKEW measure shows whether the daily returns of stock i are lognormally distributed 
during a period t. The minus sign in front of the equation indicates that the larger the value 
the more crash prone the stock is (Chen et al. 2001). Thus, positive NCSKEW value implies 
that the left tail of the stock return distribution is either longer or fatter than the right tail of 
                                                     
 
4 The existing literature uses also other stock price crash measures in a lesser extent mostly as 
subsidiary metrics (e.g. Chen et al. 2001; Ak et al. 2016) but those are out of the scope of this study. 
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the distribution (Ak et al. 2016). The logic behind this measure is that a stock price crash 
will result in an extreme left tail outcome which can be measured as negative skewness. The 
recent study of Ak et al. (2016), however, criticizes the NCSKEW measure arguing that it 
has two limitations. First, NCSKEW misclassifies stocks that have several small negative 
returns during the period (i.e. a fat left tail) as crashes while according to the definition of a 
crash only large negative returns (i.e. a long left tail) should be classified as crashes. Second, 
the measure do not identify crashes that occur in a period that has both crashes and jumps 
(i.e. large and sudden decreases and increases in stock price) since the return distribution is 
not skewed.  
The second widely used stock price crash measure, established by Hutton et al. (2009), 
recognizes a crash if at least one weekly return of a stock falls 3.09 standard deviation below 
its mean value within a fiscal year. The threshold of 3.09 is chosen to produce a frequency 
of 0.1% in the normal distribution meaning that if returns are normally distributed, 0.1% of 
the sample firms would be expected to crash in any week. To demonstrate this further, using 
the average standard deviation of weekly returns across the sample of Hutton et al. (2009), 
which is 5.8%, abnormal weekly return identified as a crash would be -18% or less. 
Ak et al. (2016) argue that the crash measure of Hutton et al. (2009) addresses the two 
limitations of skewness measure described above but it still has its own limitations. The 
measure is binary in nature (i.e. it gives only values of 0 or 1) which means that it is not 
capturing the relative magnitude of the crash. Further, a limitation which applies to both 
above measures is that they can misclassify crashes which standard deviation of stock returns 
increases after the crash (Ak et al. 2016). Post-crash return distribution is used to identify 
crashes unless the crash occurs in the last day (or week in case of the metric of Hutton et al. 
2009) of the measured period. To respond these limitations Ak et al. (2016) have conducted 
a modified version of Hutton et al. (2009) crash measure that is the negative ratio of the 
period’s minimum daily return to the standard deviation of previous period’s daily returns: 
𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 =
−𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
√∑𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1
2 /(𝑛 − 1)
 
(2) 
 
where Ri,t is the sequence of daily market-adjusted returns to stock i during period t, and n 
is the number of available observations on daily stock returns during the period. In this study, 
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CRASH as presented above is used. However, as with the NCSKEW, biotechnology 
industry-adjusted returns are used instead of market-adjusted returns. 
One of the limitations of CRASH suggested by this study, is that it only takes into 
consideration the worst return of the period, and do not consider the returns of the following 
days. For examples, if the share price drops 20% but on the next day it recovers to the same 
level or even over it, can we consider that as a crash? According to the definition of Ak et 
al. (2016), a crash is abnormally large and sudden drop in a price of a share. The definition 
does not emphasize that the stock price should stay in the same level for a while. However, 
if we think about the shareholder wealth perspective, the one day drop destroys the wealth 
of shareholders only if they sell the shares on that day. 
Using intuition, it can be said that from investor-perspective drops in share prices which are 
larger than 10 percent are already crashes for shareholders even though the returns would 
have been volatile in the past as well. Due to the above reasons, I construct an additional 
crash measure, DROP, which is not affected by the past movements of the stock, and which 
considers the post-crash returns as well. DROP defines a crash as at least 10% drop in a daily 
stock return R, where the stock price remains down at least for the five following days. Stock 
returns need to stay 8% lower for five following days (d+1, d+2, d+3, d+4 and d+5) 
compared to level at a day before a drop d-1. The figures for each day are calculated as 
follows: 
𝑑 + 1 = (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑑) ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑑+1) − 1 (3) 
𝑑 + 𝑛 = (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑑) ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑑+1) ∗ … ∗ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑑+𝑛) − 1 (4) 
 
To consider that R is only available for trading days (i.e. not for weekends and holidays) the 
metric allows that the following five days after a drop can occur, at most, during the next 
eight days. For this metric, the same daily biotechnology industry-adjusted stock returns are 
used as with the other two measures. 
As in the other measures there are also some limitations related to DROP. This measure, like 
the original measure of Hutton et al. (2009), is binary in nature which means that the 
information related to the magnitude of the crash is not utilized, and the thresholds used to 
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identify crashes are arbitrary. There is no single universally accepted exact definition of 
crash. That’s why it can be argued that the threshold of Hutton et al. (2009) is also arbitrary. 
Following Chen et al. (2001) and Ak et al. (2016) I compute each of the crash measure using 
adjusted daily with-dividend stock returns. Since the sample focuses on biotechnology 
companies, daily returns are adjusted with Fama and French value-weighted drugs industry 
index5 which is formed using companies having same SIC codes as the sample of this study 
(SIC 2833-2836). Adjusting daily returns with industry index is essential since it eliminates 
crashes that are solely caused by industry-wide declines or broad market declines (Hutton et 
al. 2009).  
Adapting to Chen et al. (2001) the daily industry-adjusted returns are calculated as a log 
change in stock i less the log change in the Fama and French value-weighted drugs industry 
index for that day (Ri,d = ln(1+RETi,d) – ln(1+Mtd))6. Log changes are used since they allow 
for natural benchmark – for examples NCSKEW gives a value of zero if stock returns are 
lognormally distributed. Using simple percentage returns instead of log changes would lead 
to a pronounced correlation between skewness and volatility, and it would cause returns to 
look more positively skewed in general (Chen et al. 2001). 
Expecting that all the firms have published their annual financial statements within four 
months of the fiscal year end date, the crash measurement period is set to cover eight-month 
period starting on the following year’s May 1 for those firms that are using calendar year as 
their fiscal year. On the other words, the model is trying to explain stock price crashes during 
May to December by looking at the figures of previous calendar year. 
NCSKEW and CRASH measures are both interpreted in a way that the larger the figure the 
stronger the crash. When the standard deviation of the returns is not skewed NCSKEW gives 
a value of zero. Thus, it can be interpreted that if a figure is below zero there are no crashes 
during the period but it might not be correct to interpret that all the positive values means 
there is at least one crash. CRASH measure on the other hand gets almost exclusively 
                                                     
 
5 Fama and French value-weighted 49 industry portfolios is downloaded from here: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_49_ind_port.html 
For examples Hutton et al. (2009) use the Fama and French industry index to adjust the returns. 
6 RETi,d is non-adjusted daily with-dividend return for stock i in a day d, and Mtd is Fama and French 
drugs industry index in a day d. 
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positive values since it’s highly unlikely that within an eight-month period daily returns 
wouldn’t be negative at even once. 
4.2. Data and sample description 
Initially, the sample of this study is combined from CRSP and COMPUSTAT merged annual 
financial data and CRSP daily stock return data covering a 15-year period of biotechnology 
industry (SIC 2833-2836) from 2002 to 2016. The sample period is limited to year 2002 in 
order to ensure the comparability of results between the examined years: SFAS 142 became 
into effect at the beginning of 2002 stating that amortization of goodwill was no longer 
permitted and annual impairment testing became mandatory.  
Similar to Ak et al. (2016), firm-years having market capitalization less than 100 million at 
the end of a fiscal year are excluded to ensure that the researched companies are investable. 
Following Hutton et al. (2009) crash periods with less than half of the stock-return data 
during the chosen period are excluded, meaning that in a period from May to December 
there needs to have at least 85 observations7. To simplify the data processing, the firm-years 
which fiscal year is other than calendar year are excluded. Finally, firm fiscal years with 
insufficient financial data to calculate the variables are excluded. The final sample includes 
1303 observations with crash metrics covering eight-month period from a year j and 
independent variable data from a previous year j-1. Table 1 presents the data modifications 
in more detail. 
Following Ak et al. (2016) and Chen et al. (2017) all continuous variables (i.e. all non-binary 
crash measures and independent variables) are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce 
the effect of outliers. This means that all data below the one-percent left tail is replaced by 
the value of 1st percentile, and all data above the one-percent right tail is set to the value of 
99th percentile. On the other words the values of the lowest (highest) one percentage tail is 
replaced by the next lowest (highest) value to mitigate the distorting effect on statistics. 
                                                     
 
7 There are on average 170 trading days in the U.S. in a period from May to December. This is from 
245 (days in a period from May to December) x 5/7 (proportion of work days per week) - 5 (holidays) 
= 170. The holidays are Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labour Day, Thanksgiving Day, and 
Christmas Day.  
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Table 1 – Data modifications 
 
No of cases an 
action removed 
Size of a sample 
   
Initial sample of annual financial data  5 920 cases 
   
Initial sample of daily stock return data  784 922 cases 
Excluding cases where:   
1) Stock return data is missing 20 006 cases 764 916 cases 
2) Data date is between January and April 246 939 cases 517 977 cases 
Aggregating stock return data to eight-month 
periods from May-Dec based on a year 
 3 314 cases 
   
Merging annual financial data and annual 
stock return data (this leaves data where both 
aggregated stock return data for year j and 
annual financial data for year j-1 exists) 
 2 680 cases 
Excluding cases where:   
1) Market capitalization is less than 100 
million dollars 
894 cases 1 786 cases 
2) Number of stock return observations in 
a period is less than 85 
75 cases 1 711 cases 
3) Firm’s fiscal year end month is not a 
calendar year 
230 cases 1 481 cases 
4) Insufficient data to count all the needed 
variables and crash metrics 
178 cases 1 303 cases 
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st 
and 99th percentiles  
 1 303 cases 
   
Table presents the main data modification steps conducted, starting from two initial samples that are 
combined to one final sample of 1303 cases.  
4.3. Independent variables 
Based on the previous literature and the intuitive expectations ten independent variables are 
chosen to test whether they forecast upcoming stock price crashes or not (Table 2). The 
independent variables are covering data from a full fiscal year which is in this case also a 
calendar year. This study uses an assumption that all the firms publish their financial annual 
reports within four months of a fiscal year end date. Thus, the crash metrics cover an eight-
month period from May to December on year j, and independent variables use information 
from a previous year j-1 that would have been available to investors at the start of each crash 
period. 
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Table 2 – Independent variable definitions 
Name of the variable Explanation Formula 
   
GOODWILL Goodwill rate Goodwill/Total assets 
GDWLIP Impairment of goodwill Dummy variable 
XRD Research and development 
expense rate 
R&D/Net sales 
MTB Market-to-book ratio Market Capitalization/Common 
ordinary equity 
logMCAP Market value of a firm Log(Market capitalization) 
SIZE Size of a firm Ln(Total assets) 
RCF Retained cash flow Change in cash and cash 
equivalent/Shareholders’ equity 
VOLATILITY Volatility of a firm’s share 
price 
Standard deviation of daily 
returns 
ROA Return on assets Net income/Total assets 
LOSS Net loss Dummy variable 
Table shows definitions for each explanatory variable used in this study. Note that GDWLIP and 
LOSS are binary variables that are receiving a value of 0 or 1.  
Goodwill rate (GOODWILL) is measured as goodwill divided by total assets at the end of 
the fiscal year. Dividing by total assets allows the comparison between companies of 
different size. Andreou et al. (2017) find that goodwill has a positive and significant 
association with future crash risk, indicating that larger goodwill increases the future stock 
price crash risk. 
Since the start of the sample period, year 2002, amortization of goodwill was no longer 
permitted and impairment testing became mandatory. If the carrying amount of goodwill 
(i.e. book value) exceeds its fair market value, an impairment loss is recognized. A dummy 
variable for impairment of goodwill (GDWLIP) is created that equals one if a firm has 
reported goodwill impairment losses during a fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Missing values 
of goodwill impairments are replaced with zero. 
Ely et al. (2003) find that the market value of companies that focus purely on drug-
development, and has no marketable products, is positively associated with both book value 
and research and development expenses. This study measures research and development 
expense rate (XRD) calculating the sum of research and development expenses for a fiscal 
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year and dividing it with net sales of the same period. The comparability of the XRD is 
improved by diving the figure with net sales.  
Market-to-book ratio (MTB) is measured as market capitalization (i.e. closing price of a 
stock for a fiscal year multiplied by number of common shares outstanding) divided by a 
common ordinary equity which represents the common shareholders’ interest in the 
company. Chen et al. (2001) find that negative skewness is greater in stock with low book-
to-market ratio. Thus, it is expected that correspondingly the market-to-book ratio, which is 
an inverse figure to book-to-market, would have a positive connection with crash risk. 
Supporting the expectation, Kim et al. (2011a) find a weak positive association between 
market-to-book value and future crash risk. However, Kim et al. (2016) could not find any 
relation between crash risk and market-to-book ratio. 
The market value of a company (logMCAP) is measured as the common logarithm of market 
capitalization (i.e. logarithm with base 10). Chen et al. (2001) and Chen et al. (2017) find 
that larger market capitalization is associated with higher crash risk. Similarly, Kim et al. 
(2011a) find weak positive association between market value and crash risk. The size of a 
company (SIZE) is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Andreou et al. (2017) 
find that size of a firm is negatively related to stock price crash risk. 
Hamill et al. (2013) state that retained cash and rate of cash expenditures are examples of 
key performance indicators for biopharmaceutical companies. In this study retained cash 
flow variable (RCF) is included which is measured as a change in cash and cash equivalents 
during a fiscal year divided by a shareholders’ equity. 
The volatility of a company’s share price (VOLATILITY) is measured as standard deviation 
of daily industry-adjusted returns during the previous period t-1. The variable is testing if 
historical volatility predicts upcoming crashes. While CRASH and NCSKEW standardize 
the crash results dividing the numerator with standard deviation of daily returns, DROP is 
an unstandardized crash metric. Hence, it is expected that the crash risk metrics differ in the 
association of VOLATILITY. 
Return on assets (ROA) is measured dividing net income with total assets. ROA is an 
indicator of how profitable a firm is relative to its total assets. Kim et al. (2011a) and Chen 
et al. (2017) find a negative association between return on assets and future crash risk. 
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Finally, a dummy variable of net loss (LOSS) is included to the model. The variable is set 
equal to one for a firm which made loss during a fiscal year (i.e. net income is negative), and 
otherwise LOSS is set equal to zero. 
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5. Research findings 
This section presents the research findings in four parts. First, the descriptive statistics and 
correlations for crash metrics and independent variables are presented. Secondly, the 
consistency levels between crash metrics are provided, indicating how well the metrics are 
recognizing crashes from the sample. On third stage, regression analysis results for the three 
crash measures are presented and discussed. Finally, four sensitivity analyses are introduced 
to demonstrate how small changes in the methodology affect to the results. 
5.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the three stock price crash measures and for ten 
independent variables used in the analysis. Recall that CRASH and NCKEW are presented 
such that a higher value denotes a larger crash. The mean value of DROP is 0.429 indicating 
that 42.9% of sample have at least one crash during a sample period. This is because DROP 
is binary by nature receiving value 0 if there are no crashes during a period and value 1 if 
there are at least one crash during a period. The figure is considerably higher than what 
Hutton et al. (2009) find in their cross-industry study from 1991 to 2005. They report that 
17.1% of their sample firm-years experience at least one crash. The difference might indicate 
that the biotechnology industry experiences more crashes than other industries on average, 
or the amount of crashes has increased over time, or that DROP identifies more crashes on 
average than the crash measure of Hutton et al. (2009). While DROP requires at least 10% 
drop in a daily stock return that must remain at the lower level for a week to be identified as 
a crash, the measure of Hutton et al. (2009) requires at least 18% drop in weekly return when 
using the average standard deviation of weekly returns across the sample of Hutton et al. 
(2009), which is 5.8%, in order to be identified as a crash. Hence, it is probable that DROP 
identifies more crashes on average than the crash metric of Hutton et al. (2009). 
The descriptive statistics of CRASH, excluding the value of 5th percentile (Table 3), are 
notably higher than the corresponding values reported by Ak et al. (2016). While CRASH 
in this study has a mean of 5.65, a standard deviation of 6.28, a 5th percentile of 1.43, a 
median of 3.52, and 95th percentile of 18.55, the figures in the study of Ak et al. (2016) are 
3.62, 2.39, 1.45, 2.91, and 8.29, respectively. This is in line with the assumption that the 
biotechnology industry experiences more crashes than other industries on average, since the 
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other two possible explanations presented above are not valid. First, the sample period of Ak 
et al. (2016) is from July 2001 to July 2014 which is relatively close to the sample period of 
this study (i.e. 2002-2016). Thus, the explanation that the amount of crashes would have 
increased over time is not reasonable. Second, the formula used to calculate CRASH is same 
than Ak et al. (2016) use in their study. Hence, the differences in measures is not a rational 
explanation for the higher values in descriptive statistics in case of CRASH metric. 
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics on crash metrics and independent variables 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
5th 
percentile 
Median 
95th 
percentile 
N 
Dependent variables      
DROP 0.429 0.495 0.000 0.000 1.000 1303 
CRASH 5.654 6.278 1.429 3.520 18.55 1303 
NCSKEW 0.246 2.565 -3.098 -0.086 5.610 1303 
Independent variables      
GOODWILL 0.070 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.310 1303 
GDWLIP 0.023 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 1303 
XRD 18.64 86.56 0.036 0.420 58.87 1303 
MTB 3.965 12.80 -3.372 3.865 17.01 1303 
logMCAP 3.036 0.916 2.089 2.730 5.051 1303 
SIZE 6.123 2.325 3.534 5.267 10.97 1303 
RCF 0.044 0.712 -0.748 0.026 0.912 1303 
VOLATILITY 0.032 0.017 0.009 0.030 0.067 1303 
ROA -0.177 0.343 -0.829 -0.078 0.214 1303 
LOSS 0.578 0.494 0.000 1.000 1.000 1303 
Table shows descriptive statistics on crash metrics and explanatory variables over the sample period 
2002-2016. 
The mean value of NCSKEW is 0.25 indicating that the sample is weakly and negatively 
skewed on average. Similar to CRASH, all the figures on descriptive statistics table related 
to NCSKEW except the 5th percentile are higher than the corresponding figures Ak et al. 
(2016) reported. While in the sample of this study NCSKEW has a mean of 0.25, a standard 
deviation of 2.56, a 5th percentile of -3.10, a median of -0.09, and 95th percentile of 5.61, Ak 
et al. (2016) reported the corresponding figures to be -0.26, 1.53, -2.71, -0.24, and 2.28 
respectively. Further, Chen et al. (2001) reported that NCSKEW has a mean of -0.26 and 
  27 
standard deviation of 0.94 measured from a cross-industry sample covering the period from 
July 1962 to December 1998. Both values are lower than the corresponding figures in this 
study. This result further reinforces the understanding that stocks of biotechnology industry 
undergo more crashes than stock in other industries on average. 
Recall that independent variables GDWLIP and LOSS are binary by nature. Thus, the mean 
value of GDWLIP indicates that only 2.3% of firm-years reported goodwill impairments, 
and mean value of LOSS indicates that 57.8% of firm-years reported net loss for a year. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables in more detail. 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix including Pearson and Spearman correlations for all 
the variables used in regression analysis. The Pearson correlations between the three crash 
metrics are all positive and highly significant. CRASH and NCSKEW are correlated the 
strongest, having a correlation of 0.69. Ak et al. (2016) find in their cross-industry study a 
correlation of 0.55 between the corresponding crash metrics. The second strongest 
correlation in this study is between DROP and CRASH, having a correlation of 0.48. DROP 
and NCSKEW has a slightly weaker correlation of 0.44. 
Measured as Pearson correlation DROP is significantly and positively correlated with 
research and development costs, volatility of past returns, and the dummy variable of net 
loss, and significantly and negatively correlated with goodwill, market value of a firm, size 
of a firm, and return on assets. CRASH is significantly and positively correlated with the 
dummy variable of net loss, and significantly and negatively correlated with goodwill, 
market value of a firm, size of a firm, retained cash flow, volatility of past returns, and return 
on assets. NCSKEW is correlating, at the significance level of 0.05 or lower, negatively with 
goodwill and return on assets. 
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5.2. Consistency of crash measures 
Since DROP measure is binary by nature and for other two measures there are no predefined 
limits which would identify crashes from no-crashes, limits are set for CRASH and 
NCSKEW to compare the results between the measures. The limits are set based on the 
percentage of crashes DROP identifies. The percentage of eight-month periods during which 
one or more crashes occur is 42.9 % for each measure. Thus, a period is defined to have at 
least one crash if CRASH exceeds 3.997, or NCSKEW exceeds 0.096. Note that CRASH 
and NCSKEW are set as binary variable only under this subsection, particularly in Table 5, 
and are later preferred as continuous variables unless otherwise stated.  
Table 5 – Crash measure consistency matrices 
 
CRASH  
One or more 
crashes 
No crashes 
Cohen’s 
Kappa 
DROP 
One or more crashes 32.0 % 10.9 % 
0.555** 
No crashes 10.9 % 46.2 % 
 
 
NCSKEW  
One or more 
crashes 
No crashes 
Cohen’s 
Kappa 
CRASH 
One or more crashes 31.2 % 11.7 % 
0.524** 
No crashes 11.7 % 45.4 % 
 
 
DROP  
One or more 
crashes 
No crashes 
Cohen’s 
Kappa 
NCSKEW 
One or more crashes 28.9 % 14.0 % 
0.427** 
No crashes 14.0 % 43.1 % 
Table shows consistency level matrices and values of Cohen’s Kappa between the crash metrics. 
Here ** indicates 1% significance (two-tailed). Note that CRASH and NCSKEW are set as binary 
variables to allow the comparison between the metrics. 
The level of total consistency between the binary metrics is from 72.0 to 78.2 percent 
meaning that two metrics get the same firm-specific result (i.e. at least one crash or no 
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crashes) with the probability of 72.0-78.2 percent (Table 5). On the other hand, the metrics 
give a different result for 21.8-28.0 percent of the sample periods. The results of DROP and 
CRASH measures are the closest from each other, agreeing that the same 32.0% of the 
periods have at least one crash, and the same 46.2% of the periods do not have any crashes, 
summing up to the total consistency of 78.2%. This leaves 21.8% of the periods that have 
conflicting results; the other metric states that there is at least one crash and the other states 
that there are no crashes during the period. 
The second highest consistency level is between CRASH and NCSKEW having a same 
result for 76.6% of the observations, and the lowest consistency is between DROP and 
NCSKEW having a same result for 72.0% of the sample periods. You can find the matrices 
from Table 5 where the results are presented in more detail. 
Note that since the amount of crashes is forced to equal despite which metric is being used, 
the percentages of cases where metrics are disagreeing with each other are the same within 
a matrix. For examples DROP and CRASH both identify that 42.9% of the periods have at 
least one crash, but they are agreeing which periods have crashes only with 32.0% of the 
whole sample. Thus, for 10.9 percentage point DROP identifies at least one crash while 
CRASH do not, and the same goes for other way around as well. 
Cohen’s Kappa presented in Table 5 is a measure of agreement used to determine how well 
two categorical metrics are reporting same results. The test receives values between 0 and 1, 
where 1 indicates a perfect agreement between the measures and 0 indicates that the 
agreement is as good as by chance. Cohen’s Kappa controls for chance factor, meaning that 
it takes into consideration how good the level of consistency would have been by chance. 
Thus, each of the values is smaller than the corresponding level of consistency presented 
above, which is simply calculated based on frequencies. (Watson & Petrie 2010) 
The values of Cohen’s Kappa between the three dummy variables are all statistically highly 
significant. The highest Cohen’s Kappa is between DROP and CRASH, having a value of 
0.56. CRASH and NCSKEW have almost as high level of agreement, which is 0.52, whereas 
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NCSKEW and DROP have the lowest level of agreement, having Cohen’s Kappa of 0.43.8 
The strength of agreements between the crash metrics are in the moderate level (Landis & 
Koch 1977). 
5.3. Regression analysis results 
In this subsection, the regression analysis results for all the three crash measures, DROP, 
CRASH, and NCSKEW, are presented. Finally, the regression results are concluded and 
discussed. 
5.3.1. DROP 
The study sample consists of 1303 observation periods, each covering an eight-month of 
stock return data and financial data from a full fiscal year. DROP identifies 559 periods 
during which at least one crash occurs. By predicting that there are no crashes (i.e. using a 
null model), the classification accuracy would be 57.1%. The logistic regression model, 
which results are reported on Table 6, can detect correctly 56.9% of cases when there is at 
least one crash, and 71.9% of cases when there are no crashes. Hence, the overall predictive 
capacity of the model is 65.5%, increasing the predictive capacity compared to the null 
model by 8.6 percentage points.  
The logistic regression model includes three statistically significant independent variables: 
VOLATILITY, ROA, and XRD. First, higher VOLATILITY is associated with higher crash 
risk, but the magnitude alters notably within the sample. The odds-ratio of VOLATILITY is 
approximately 5.39 million, indicating that for each one unit increase in VOLATILITY, the 
odds of having at least one crash during a period, when controlling for other variables, 
increases around 5.39 million times higher. Note that the range of VOLATILITY in the 
sample is, however, only 0.09. Thus, it is more reasonable to state that 0.01 unit increase in 
VOLATILITY leads to approximately 53.9 thousand times greater likelihood that at least 
                                                     
 
8 The Pearson correlations between the three dummy crash metrics equal to the values of Cohen’s 
Kappa between the variables. Note that Pearson correlations between DROP, and continuous 
CRASH and NCSKEW differ from the correlations between the dummy variables (see Table 4). 
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one crash occurs during a period.9 The 95% confidence interval for the odds-ratio of 
VOLATILITY is from 742.6 to 3.9x1010 indicating that 95% of odds-ratios is between that 
range. Hence, firms with high historical volatility in stock returns experience more crashes 
on average. 
Table 6 – Logistic regression results using DROP as the dependent variable 
Variable 
Beta 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Wald p-value Odds-ratio 
      
Intercept 1.058* 0.422 6.269 0.012 2.880 
GOODWILL -0.103 0.752 0.019 0.891 0.902 
GDWLIP 0.000 0.452 0.000 0.999 1.000 
XRD 0.002* 0.001 4.354 0.037 1.002 
MTB -0.001 0.005 0.085 0.771 0.999 
logMCAP -0.311 0.241 1.657 0.198 0.733 
SIZE -0.172 0.102 2.851 0.091 0.842 
RCF -0.049 0.085 0.326 0.568 0.953 
VOLATILITY 15.501** 4.536 11.677 0.001 5393454.131 
ROA -0.658* 0.284 5.368 0.021 0.518 
LOSS -0.122 0.192 0.404 0.525 0.885 
      
Nagelkerke R-Square 0.224    
Table shows regression analysis results for the model using DROP as the dependent variables. Here 
* and ** indicate, respectively, 5% and 1% significance (two-tailed). 
Secondly, higher ROA is related to lower likelihood of crashes. The odds-ratio of ROA is 
0.518 indicating that one unit increase in ROA is associated with the 48.2% reduction in the 
probability of having one or more crashes during the following period. The confidence 
interval with a 95% confidence level is between 0.297 and 0.904 referring that the reduction 
in crash risk is typically from 9.6 to 70.3 percent. Thus, firms using more effectively their 
assets to generate earnings are more likely to experience less stock price crashes. 
                                                     
 
9 Due to the abnormally high odds-ratio of VOLATILITY, as a robustness check, the regression is 
run without the variable. The explanatory power of the model slightly decreases and the odds-ratios 
of other independent variables do not change substantially, indicating that the odds-ratio of 
VOLATILITY is distorted, and its magnitude to the likelihood of future crashes is not as strong as 
the ratio suggests.  
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Finally, higher XRD is associated with higher crash risk. XRD has an odds-ratio of 1.002 
indicating that for one unit increase the likelihood of having at least one crash during a period 
is 1.002 times higher controlling for other variables. The 95% confidence interval for the 
odds-ratio of XRD is from 1.000 to 1.003. The results show that firms with larger relative 
size of research and development costs have slightly higher crash risk on average. Note that 
since the standard deviations of the three independent variables are varying a lot (i.e. from 
0.017 to 86.56; see Table 3) it is not reasonable to compare the magnitude of odds-ratios in 
isolation. 
The model has Nagelkerke R-Square value of 0.224 (Table 6). The measure is rather similar 
than R-Square used in multiple regression analysis. R-Square is the proportion of total 
sample variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the independent variable. On 
the other words, R-Square indicates how well the model is explaining the variation in the 
dependent variable. Thus, the logistic regression model is explaining roughly 22.4% of the 
variation in DROP. However, Nagelkerke R-Square is one of the pseudo R-Square measures 
which are created for logistic regression analysis to approximate R-Square, and for that 
reason the values of Nagelkerke R-Square and R-Square or Adjusted R-Square cannot be 
directly compared.  
5.3.2. CRASH 
Table 7 represents the results of multiple regression analysis using CRASH as the dependent 
variable. The regression has two statistically significant independent variables, 
VOLATILITY and ROA, both being highly significant at the 1% level. Both variables have 
negative association with CRASH referring that higher VOLATILITY and ROA are related 
to lower crash risk. The unstandardized beta coefficient of VOLATILITY is -106.3 
indicating that one unit increase in VOLATILITY is associated with -106.3 unit decrease in 
the dependent variable CRASH. The 95% confidence interval for the unstandardized beta 
coefficient is between -131.1 and -81.4, referring that there is a 95% likelihood that 
unstandardized beta coefficients of VOLATILITY are between the range.  
The regression results related to VOLATILITY contradict with the results when using 
DROP as the dependent variable. I suggest that the conflicting results are caused by the 
fundamental difference between the two metrics. CRASH normalizes the stock price returns 
by dividing them with a standard deviation of returns from the last period. Hence, when 
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VOLATILITY (measured as the last period’s standard deviation of daily returns) is high, 
CRASH interprets that there are no crashes while DROP considers only the magnitude of 
the absolute drops in the stock returns. Further, I propose that VOLATILITY is negatively 
related to CRASH since, due to the characteristics of the metric, crashes are only possible if 
VOLATILITY is low. 
Table 7 – Multiple regression results using CRASH as the dependent variable 
Variable 
Beta 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
t-value p-value 
     
Intercept 10.356** 1.129 9.169 0.000 
GOODWILL -3.437 1.971 -1.744 0.081 
GDWLIP 0.597 1.148 0.520 0.603 
XRD -0.001 0.002 -0.347 0.729 
MTB -0.004 0.014 -0.307 0.759 
logMCAP 0.418 0.669 0.625 0.532 
SIZE -0.524 0.285 -1.840 0.066 
RCF -0.246 0.241 -1.023 0.306 
VOLATILITY -106.274** 12.657 -8.397 0.000 
ROA -2.586** 0.779 -3.321 0.001 
LOSS 0.784 0.534 1.468 0.142 
     
Adjusted R-Square 0.075    
F-value 11.497**    
Table shows regression analysis results for the model using CRASH as the dependent variable. Here 
* and ** indicate, respectively, 5% and 1% significance (two-tailed). Beta coefficients are 
unstandardized. 
The unstandardized beta coefficient for ROA is -2.6, indicating that for each unit increase 
CRASH is going to be on average 2.6 units lower. The confidence interval for beta 
coefficient in the level of 95% is from -4.1 to -1.1. The regression results related to ROA are 
in line with the results from logistic regression analysis where DROP is the dependent 
variable. However, there seems to be no association between CRASH and XRD, unlike with 
DROP and XRD, since the p-value of 0.73 shows that the relation is statistically highly 
insignificant. 
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The value of Adjusted R-Square is 0.075 indicating that 7.5% of the variance in dependent 
variable is explained by the independent variables. On the other words, the overall 
explanatory power of the regression is 7.5%. F-value and t-values are indicators of statistical 
significance where F-value reflects the overall significance of the model whereas t-values 
reflect the significance of individual predictors. Larger F-value indicates higher significance 
of the model, and higher t-value in case of positive beta coefficient and lower t-value in case 
of negative beta coefficient indicate higher significance of the variable. F-value of this model 
is statistically highly significant, indicating that the explanatory variables in this model are 
able to explain the variance in the crash risk metric.  
5.3.3. NCSKEW 
Results of the multiple regression analysis where NCSKEW is the dependent variable are 
presented in Table 8. The regression has two statistically significant independent variables 
at the level of 5%: logMCAP and ROA. First, higher logMCAP is associated with higher 
crash risk. The unstandardized beta coefficient of logMCAP is 0.67, and the 95% confidence 
interval for the value is between 0.11 and 1.22. Thus, firms with higher market capitalization 
(i.e. the market value of a firm’s outstanding shares) have higher crash risk measured as the 
skewness of the return distribution. DROP and CRASH do not show similar relation with 
market capitalization and crash risk.  
Secondly, higher ROA is associated with lower likelihood of crashes. ROA has an 
unstandardized beta coefficient of -0.74 with rather large fluctuation. The 95% confidence 
interval for beta coefficient is from -1.39 to -0.09. The result is consistent with the results of 
models using DROP or CRASH as the dependent variable. 
Adjusted R-Square value for the model is 0.009, indicating that the model is explaining 0.9% 
of the variance in the dependent variable. Thus, the explanatory power of the model with 
NCSKEW as the dependent variable is relatively low. In comparison, the explanatory power 
of CRASH regression model is 7.5%. The statistical significance of the model, measured 
with F-value, is 2.2. That is notably lower than in the regression which uses CRASH as the 
dependent variable, having the F-value of 11.5 (see Table 7). The F-value in this model is 
statistically significant, referring that the independent variables are, however, able to explain 
the variance in the dependent variable.  
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Table 8 – Multiple regression results using NCSKEW as the dependent variable 
Variable 
Beta 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
t-value p-value 
     
Intercept -0.593 0.477 -1.243 0.214 
GOODWILL -0.862 0.833 -1.035 0.301 
GDWLIP 0.250 0.485 0.515 0.606 
XRD -0.001 0.001 -1.256 0.209 
MTB 0.002 0.006 0.416 0.678 
logMCAP 0.668* 0.283 2.362 0.018 
SIZE -0.222 0.120 -1.843 0.066 
RCF -0.105 0.102 -1.036 0.300 
VOLATILITY 6.317 5.349 1.181 0.238 
ROA -0.740* 0.329 -2.248 0.025 
LOSS -0.161 0.226 -0.714 0.475 
     
Adjusted R-Square 0.009    
F-value 2.237*    
Table shows regression analysis results for the model using NCSKEW as the dependent variable. 
Here * and ** indicate, respectively, 5% and 1% significance (two-tailed). Beta coefficients are 
unstandardized. 
5.3.4. Interpretation of the results 
Table 9 summarizes the regression results of each model. Four of the explanatory variables 
are statistically significant in at least one model using one of the three crash measures as the 
dependent variable. These four variables are ROA, VOLATILITY, XRD, and logMCAP. 
The most obvious indicator seems to be ROA, having consistently negative association with 
crash risk, and being statistically significant predictor in each model. Thus, I find that ROA 
is negatively associated with future crash risk, indicating that more profitable firms in 
relation to their total assets are less likely to experience stock price crashes. This result is 
consistent with the cross-industry studies of Kim et al. (2011a) and Chen et al. (2017). 
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Table 9 – Comparison of regression results between the three main models 
     DROP     CRASH     NCSKEW 
 Beta p-value Beta p-value Beta p-value 
Intercept 1.058 0.012 10.356 0.000 -0.593 0.214 
GOODWILL -0.103 0.891 -3.437 0.081 -0.862 0.301 
GDWLIP 0.000 0.999 0.597 0.603 0.250 0.606 
XRD 0.002 0.037 -0.001 0.729 -0.001 0.209 
MTB -0.001 0.771 -0.004 0.759 0.002 0.678 
logMCAP -0.311 0.198 0.418 0.532 0.668 0.018 
SIZE -0.172 0.091 -0.524 0.066 -0.222 0.066 
RCF -0.049 0.568 -0.246 0.306 -0.105 0.300 
VOLATILITY 15.501 0.001 -106.274 0.000 6.317 0.238 
ROA -0.658 0.021 -2.586 0.001 -0.740 0.025 
LOSS -0.122 0.525 0.784 0.142 -0.161 0.475 
       
Nagelkerke/Adjusted 
R-Square 
 0.224  0.075  0.009 
Table shows the unstandardized beta coefficients and p-values for the variables in each model using 
different dependent variables. 
The bolded values are statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). 
Second notable indicator for crash risk is VOLATILITY, having positive and significant 
association with the dependent variable DROP. On the contrary, VOLATILITY is 
negatively associated with CRASH and has statistically insignificant relation with 
NCSKEW. Recall that the crash risk metric DROP is demonstrating the extreme negative 
stock returns without normalizing the results with standard deviation, whereas CRASH 
normalizes the most negative stock return of the period with the previous period’s standard 
deviation of the return distribution, and NCSKEW normalizes the skewness of the return 
distribution with the same period’s standard deviation of the returns. Hence, CRASH do not 
define large negative returns as stock price crashes if the volatility of the previous period 
has been high, and NCSKEW do not define negative skewness of return distribution as stock 
price crashes if the volatility of the same period has been high. On the other hand, 
VOLATILITY is demonstrating the previous period’s standard deviation of daily returns. 
This explain the negative association between VOLATILY and CRASH: if VOLATILITY 
is high, CRASH do not identify stock price crashes due to the normalized returns. 
Consistently, the statistically insignificant relation between VOLATILITY and NCSKEW 
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can be justified. As mentioned, NCSKEW is normalized with the same period’s standard 
deviation. However, standard deviation of the same period and previous period are 
intuitively rarely the same, indicating that high VOLATILITY do not automatically refer to 
the absence of crashes, as it does with CRASH, nor to the higher likelihood of crashes, as 
with DROP. 
Thirdly, XRD has a week positive and statistically significant association with DROP. Ely 
et al. (2003) find that higher research and development expenses are related to higher market 
value of a biotechnology firm. I suggest that once the development of a drug is reached to 
the stage where investors start to treat research and development expenses as probable future 
revenue-generating assets (Ely et al. 2003), the failure of the drug development might cause 
a stock price crash. However, in this study the other two crash measures, besides DROP, 
show that the relation between XRD and crash risk is not statistically significant. Due to the 
weak association, I suggest that the connection between XRD and crash risk requires further 
research. 
Finally, logMCAP has positive and statistically significant association with NCSKEW, 
indicating that larger firms in terms of market capitalization are more negatively skewed. 
Chen et al. (2001) and Chen et al. (2017) find consistent positive relation between market 
capitalization and the stock distribution skewness measure. The other two crash metrics in 
the study did not show statistically significant relation between the crash risk and logMCAP. 
However, results of collinearity statistics show signs of multicollinearity between logMCAP 
and SIZE, indicating that further analyses are needed to confirm the association between 
logMCAP and crash risk as well as SIZE and crash risk. The concept of multicollinearity is 
further explained and the needed analysis are conducted as part of sensitivity analysis in the 
next subsection. 
5.4. Sensitivity analyses 
In this subsection, four sensitivity analyses are conducted to test the robustness and 
sensitivity of the model. Small changes are done to the main regression model related to 
multicollinearity, winsorized outliers, the length of the crash period, and subsectors of 
biotechnology industry. 
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5.4.1. Effects of multicollinearity 
As part of the multiple regression analysis collinearity statistics, especially tolerance and 
variance inflation factor (VIF) are considered, to recognize possible multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity refers to a phenomenon where two or more independent variables are 
highly linearly associated. Even though multicollinearity does not reduce the significance or 
explanatory power of the model, it may affect to the validity of individual explanatory 
variable results. The collinearity statistics show that SIZE has a tolerance of 0.06 and VIF 
of 15.64, and logMCAP has, respectively, values of 0.08 and 13.41, and in addition the 
correlation between the two variables is 0.96. These values can be considered as significant 
signs of multicollinearity. The other independent variables are significantly different from 
SIZE and logMCAP in respect of collinearity statistics, having a tolerance of 0.39 or larger 
and VIF of 2.6 or smaller, indicating that there is no suspicion of multicollinearity related to 
the other variables.  
The regression analysis is run again for all the three dependent variables leaving first out 
SIZE, and then leaving out logMCAP, while keeping everything else unchanged, to see how 
the multicollinearity is affecting to the regression results. Table 10 presents the results for 
each crash metrics and for each combination of independent variables, including the main 
models, to allow the comparison.  
First, by leaving SIZE out of the model logMCAP becomes statistically highly significant 
for the models using DROP or CRASH as the dependent variable. Additionally, for the 
regression using CRASH as the dependent variable GOODWILL becomes statistically 
highly significant. On the contrary, when SIZE is removed from the model using NCSKEW 
as the dependent variable the results of logMCAP transform from significant to insignificant.  
Secondly, by leaving logMCAP out of the model, SIZE transforms from insignificant to 
highly significant predictor for the models which are using either DROP or CRASH as the 
dependent variable. The results of the model using the third metric, NCSKEW, do not 
experience remarkable changes besides that the number of statistically significant predictors 
decrease by one when logMCAP (which is statistically significant in the main model) is 
removed from the model. 
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Table 10 – Sensitivity analysis results: effects of multicollinearity 
 
Beta coefficients and p-values 
 DROP CRASH NCSKEW 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 1.058 1.114 0.794 10.356 10.596 10.686 -0.593 -0.492 -0.066 
 0.012 0.008 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.214 0.300 0.875 
GOODWILL -0.103 -0.541 0.078 -3.437 -4.811 -3.727 -0.862 -1.444 -1.325 
0.891 0.441 0.917 0.081 0.009 0.052 0.301 0.062 0.102 
GDWLIP 0.000 -0.150 0.088 0.597 0.229 0.497 0.250 0.094 0.091 
0.999 0.738 0.842 0.603 0.840 0.662 0.606 0.844 0.850 
XRD 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
0.037 0.037 0.039 0.729 0.723 0.737 0.209 0.207 0.225 
MTB 
logMCAP 
-0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.002 0.004 0.005 
0.771 0.973 0.618 0.759 0.979 0.834 0.678 0.481 0.422 
-0.311 -0.674 X 0.418 -0.711 X 0.668 0.190 X 
0.198 0.000 X 0.532 0.008 X 0.018 0.092 X 
SIZE -0.172 X -0.289 -0.524 X -0.361 -0.222 X 0.039 
0.091 X 0.000 0.066 X 0.002 0.066 X 0.418 
RCF -0.049 -0.051 -0.048 -0.246 -0.254 -0.247 -0.105 -0.109 -0.107 
0.568 0.545 0.571 0.306 0.292 0.305 0.300 0.286 0.295 
VOLATILITY 15.501 15.695 16.483 -106.3 -105.8 -107.5 6.317 6.508 4.291 
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.224 0.417 
ROA -0.658 -0.769 -0.596 -2.586 -2.922 -2.683 -0.740 -0.882 -0.896 
0.021 0.005 0.034 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.006 0.006 
LOSS -0.122 -0.123 -0.103 0.784 0.776 0.749 -0.161 -0.164 -0.217 
 0.525 0.521 0.592 0.142 0.147 0.159 0.475 0.467 0.335 
          
Nagelkerke/ 
Adjusted R-
Square 
0.224 0.222 0.223 0.075 0.073 0.075 0.009 0.008 0.006 
Table shows the unstandardized beta coefficients and p-values for the variables in each model using 
different dependent variables and different combinations of independent variables. P-values are 
presented below the beta coefficients. 
(1). The main model with all the ten variables 
(2). A model without SIZE 
(3). A model without logMCAP 
The bolded values are statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). 
As a conclusion, when taking multicollinearity into consideration, both SIZE and logMCAP 
are statistically significant predictors. The variables have a negative association with crash 
risk, indicating that smaller firms in terms of market capitalization or total assets have higher 
stock price crash risk than larger firms. However, when defining a crash as negative 
  41 
skewness, there seems to be no connection between the size of the firms or market 
capitalization of the firms and future crash risk.  
Consistently with this study, Andreou et al. (2017) report that smaller firms in term of total 
assets have higher likelihood to experience stock price crashes in the future. On the contrary 
to the results of this study, cross-industry studies of Chen et al. (2001) and Chen et al. (2017) 
report a positive association with market capitalization and crash risk. I suggest that in the 
biotechnology sector larger firms in terms of market capitalization or total assets are 
experiencing less crashes since larger firms are not as dependent on the success of one drug 
as smaller biotechnology firms are. Supporting this suggestion Girotra et al. (2007) find that 
the failure of phase III clinical trials impacts less to the market valuation of the firms if the 
firm is developing other drugs for the same market as the failed drug or if the firm is 
developing other drugs that require same resources as the failed drug used. Intuitively it can 
be expected that larger firms have more ongoing projects for the same market or more 
ongoing project that need same resources as the failed drug, and hence larger biotechnology 
firms are less prone to stock price crashes. 
5.4.2. Dealing with outliers 
Following the existing academic literature from the field (e.g. Ak et al. 2016; Chen et al. 
2017), all the continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles to mitigate the 
effect of outliers. As a sensitivity check, the effects are tested by comparing the results of 
the main model to results using non-winsorized data. I find that using non-winsorized data 
causes small changes to the results.  
Table 11 presents the regression results for each model including the results of the main 
models. First, the explanatory power of the model when using DROP as the dependent 
variable stays the same. However, one of the independent variables, XRD, transforms from 
significant to insignificant, having a p-value of 0.067, which is slightly over the threshold.  
Secondly, the predictive power of the model using CRASH at the crash metric is weaker, 
and there are some differences in the significance levels of predictors when the data is not 
winsorized. The predictive power measured as Adjusted R-Square reduces from 7.5% to 
5.8%, and F-value, which is measuring the significance of the model, declines from 11.5 to 
9.0. The independent variables SIZE and LOSS transform from insignificant to significant 
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predictors where SIZE has a negative association and LOSS has a positive association with 
crash risk. Further, ROA transforms from significant to insignificant predictor.  
Finally, the changes with the model utilizing NCSKEW are similar to changes with the 
model utilizing CRASH. The predictive power declines from 0.9% to 0.4%, F-value reduces 
from 2.2 to 1.6, and SIZE becomes significant and ROA becomes insignificant predictor.  
Table 11 – Sensitivity analysis results: dealing with outliers 
 Beta coefficients and p-values 
 DROP CRASH NCSKEW 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Intercept 1.058 1.149 10.356 9.717 -0.593 -0.772 
 0.012 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.214 0.106 
GOODWILL -0.103 -0.078 -3.437 -3.283 -0.862 -0.706 
0.891 0.917 0.081 0.130 0.301 0.410 
GDWLIP 0.000 -0.012 0.597 0.510 0.250 0.236 
0.999 0.979 0.603 0.399 0.606 0.641 
XRD 0.002 0.001 -0.001 1.5x10-5 -0.001 -1.3x10-5 
0.037 0.067 0.729 0.949 0.209 0.886 
MTB -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.001 
0.771 0.730 0.759 0.734 0.678 0.848 
logMCAP -0.311 -0.323 0.418 0.733 0.668 0.758 
0.198 0.172 0.532 0.312 0.018 0.008 
SIZE -0.172 -0.178 -0.524 -0.664 -0.222 -0.266 
0.091 0.076 0.066 0.031 0.066 0.029 
RCF -0.049 -0.015 -0.246 -0.054 -0.105 -0.004 
0.568 0.492 0.306 0.438 0.300 0.885 
VOLATILITY 15.501 14.163 -106.3 -94.15 6.317 8.873 
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.076 
ROA -0.658 -0.558 -2.586 -0.264 -0.740 0.044 
0.021 0.029 0.001 0.308 0.025 0.669 
LOSS -0.122 -0.074 0.784 1.888 -0.161 0.176 
0.525 0.692 0.142 0.000 0.475 0.355 
       
Nagelkerke/Adjusted 
R-Square 
0.224 0.225 0.075 0.058 0.009 0.004 
Table shows the unstandardized beta coefficients and p-values for the variables in each model using 
different dependent variables. P-values are presented below the beta coefficients. 
(1). The main model with winsorized variables 
(2). A model with non-winsorized variables  
The bolded values are statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). 
  43 
Overall, the test shows that the outliers are affecting to the results at some level. The largest 
effects are the increase in the significance of SIZE and LOSS, and the decrease in the 
significance of XRD and ROA. I suggest, however, that winsorizing outliers provides likely 
more useful information to determine the indicators of crash risk. 
5.4.3. Extending the crash period 
In the main model, the crash metrics are measured from the beginning of May to the end of 
December. This leaves a four-month lag between the predictor data and crash risk data. As 
a sensitivity analysis, I test how extending the crash period to last from January to December 
affects to the regression results. Due to the change in the crash period, the financial 
information used as predictors is not available to the investors during the first months of the 
crash period until the firm publish the annual financial report. Regression results are 
presented in Table 12, and the main differences between the two models for each crash 
measure are discussed below. 
Extending the crash period improves explanatory power of all the three models having 
different crash metrics. First, the classification accuracy of the model using DROP as the 
dependent variable improves 17.9 percentage points compared to the null model (from 
52.5% to 70.4%), whereas with the shorter crash period the increase in accuracy is only 8.6 
percentage points. Further, the explanatory power of predictors, measured as Nagelkerke R-
Square, increases from 22.4% to 30.4% compared to the main model, and XRD transforms 
from significant to insignificant independent variable. 
Secondly, the explanatory power of the model, using CRASH as the dependent variable, 
increases from 7.5% to 8.7% when the crash period is extended. The significance of the 
model, measured as F-value, increases slightly from 11.5 to 13.4. Further, GOODWILL 
becomes a significant predictor, having beta coefficient of -4.9, indicating a negative 
association between the predictor and crash risk.  
The explanatory power of the third model, having NCSKEW as the crash metric, improves 
from 0.9% to 2.0% when using extended crash period. F-value, the measure for the 
significance of the model, increases from 2.2 to 3.7. Extending the crash period does not 
affect notably to the significance levels of the independent variables. 
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Table 12 – Sensitivity analysis results: extending the crash period 
 
Beta coefficients and p-values 
 DROP CRASH NCSKEW 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Intercept 1.058 1.297 10.356 11.287 -0.593 -0.585 
 0.012 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.214 0.280 
GOODWILL -0.103 -1.109 -3.437 -4.860 -0.862 -1.640 
 0.891 0.139 0.081 0.023 0.301 0.082 
GDWLIP 0.000 -0.394 0.597 0.123 0.250 -0.055 
 0.999 0.403 0.603 0.923 0.606 0.922 
XRD 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 0.037 0.077 0.729 0.412 0.209 0.402 
MTB -0.001 -0.010 -0.004 -0.016 0.002 0.000 
 0.771 0.085 0.759 0.286 0.678 0.972 
logMCAP -0.311 -0.316 0.418 0.328 0.668 0.680 
 0.198 0.206 0.532 0.652 0.018 0.034 
SIZE -0.172 -0.159 -0.524 -0.468 -0.222 -0.226 
 0.091 0.135 0.066 0.133 0.066 0.100 
RCF -0.049 0.081 -0.246 -0.091 -0.105 -0.092 
 0.568 0.395 0.306 -0.347 0.300 0.425 
VOLATILITY 15.501 20.077 -106.3 -111.2 6.317 7.443 
 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.210 
ROA -0.658 -0.832 -2.586 -3.511 -0.740 -0.946 
 0.021 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.025 0.012 
LOSS -0.122 0.002 0.784 0.928 -0.161 -0.010 
 0.525 0.992 0.142 0.110 0.475 0.970 
       
Nagelkerke/Adjusted 
R-Square 
0.224 0.304 0.075 0.087 0.009 0.020 
Table shows the unstandardized beta coefficients and p-values for the variables in each model using 
different dependent variables. P-values are presented below the beta coefficients. 
(1). The main model with crash period from May to December 
(2). A model with crash period from January to December  
The bolded values are statistically significant (p-value < 0.05).  
As a conclusion, one explanation why the predictive power is higher for all the three models 
when extending the crash period can be that many companies publish their annual financial 
report during March or early April. Thus, a lot of crashes that occur due to the financials 
during the next few days after the release date are not caught by the main model with shorter 
crash period. However, in biotechnology sector earnings announcements have much lower 
impact on share prices than drug development announcements (Dedman et al. 2008), 
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referring that there is likely some other more important matters that explain this phenomenon 
better. 
5.4.4. Pharmaceuticals compared to pure-play biotechs 
The sample of this study consist of pharmaceutical companies (SIC 2834) and pure-play 
biotechnology companies (SIC 2833, 2835-2836). Pharmaceutical firms utilize also non-
biotechnology methods in research and development, and firms can operate also in other 
health care areas, such as production of health care and animal products, whereas pure-play 
biotechnology firms focus on discovery and development of drugs (Ely et al. 2003). I test 
how the regression analysis results differ between these two types of biotechnology firms, 
and is the regression model better to explain changes in dependent variables in one type than 
in other type of firms. 
Dividing the sample to two parts leaves 823 pharmaceutical firms and 480 pure-play 
biotechnology firms. With the sample of pharmaceutical firms DROP identifies at least one 
crash in 38.0% of the sample periods, whereas the corresponding figure is 51.3% for the 
pure-play biotechnology firms, indicating that the latter firms are more crash-prone than 
pharmaceutical companies. Further, the mean values for CRASH and NCSKEW are larger 
for the pure-play biotechnology firms than for the pharmaceutical firms, supporting the 
findings.  
Table 13 presents the regression results for each crash metrics. First, the model using DROP 
as the dependent variable has classification accuracy of 68.2% for the pharmaceutical and 
62.7% for the pure-play biotech companies (not reported), and Nagelkerke R-Square values 
are, respectively, 0.244 and 0.164, indicating that the accuracy and explanatory power of the 
model are better for pharmaceutical firms. While the main model has three statistically 
significant predictors, XRD, VOLATILITY, and ROA, the pharmaceutical firms have only 
VOLATILITY, and the pure-play biotechnology firms have only ROA as statistically 
significant independent variable.  
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Table 13 – Sensitivity analysis results: subsamples 
 
Beta coefficients and p-values 
 DROP CRASH NCSKEW 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 1.058 0.897 1.051 10.356 10.619 8.296 -0.593 -0.463 -1.045 
 0.012 0.108 0.159 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.214 0.450 0.244 
GOODWILL -0.103 0.710 -0.946 -3.437 -1.724 -5.747 -0.862 -0.394 -1.454 
 0.891 0.518 0.366 0.081 0.506 0.068 0.301 0.727 0.251 
GDWLIP 0.000 -0.375 0.525 0.597 -0.317 2.775 0.250 -0.271 1.540 
 0.999 0.544 0.482 0.603 0.809 0.220 0.606 0.635 0.092 
XRD 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 
 0.037 0.396 0.082 0.729 0.947 0.488 0.209 0.030 0.898 
MTB -0.001 0.005 -0.010 -0.004 -0.008 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.006 
 0.771 0.452 0.185 0.759 0.661 0.977 0.678 0.911 0.467 
logMCAP -0.311 -0.173 -0.541 0.418 0.961 -0.242 0.668 0.948 0.332 
 0.198 0.581 0.169 0.532 0.241 0.838 0.018 0.008 0.486 
SIZE -0.172 -0.242 -0.032 -0.524 -0.830 0.128 -0.222 -0.361 -0.015 
 0.091 0.064 0.851 0.066 0.016 0.808 0.066 0.016 0.942 
RCF -0.049 -0.007 -0.087 -0.246 -0.042 -0.464 -0.105 0.022 -0.234 
 0.568 0.954 0.490 0.306 0.894 0.217 0.300 0.877 0.123 
VOLATILITY 15.501 19.091 12.093 -106.3 -107.3 -101.4 6.317 2.449 13.294 
 0.001 0.002 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.733 0.105 
ROA -0.658 -0.467 -1.086 -2.586 -2.486 -3.127 -0.740 -0.977 -0.494 
 0.021 0.207 0.021 0.001 0.011 0.020 0.025 0.022 0.361 
LOSS -0.122 -0.136 -0.099 0.784 0.657 1.061 -0.161 -0.200 -0.108 
 0.525 0.587 0.752 0.142 0.315 0.260 0.475 0.482 0.776 
          
Observations 1303 823 480 1303 823 480 1303 823 480 
Nagelkerke/ 
Adjusted      
R-Square 
0.224 0.244 0.164 0.075 0.077 0.064 0.009 0.014 0.004 
Table shows the unstandardized beta coefficients and p-values for the variables in each model using 
different dependent variables and samples for pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms. P-values are 
presented below the beta coefficients. 
(1). The main model with the whole sample 
(2). A model using a subsample of pharmaceutical firms 
(3). A model using a subsample of pure-play biotechnology firms 
The bolded values are statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). 
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The second model, using CRASH as the dependent variable, has R-Square value of 0.077 
for the pharmaceutical firms and 0.064 for the pure-play biotechnology firms, and F-values 
are, respectively, 7.8 and 4.3, indicating that the explanatory power and significance of the 
model are higher for pharmaceutical firms. Both regression results have VOLATILITY and 
ROA as statistically significant predictors similar to the main model. For the pharmaceutical 
firms, however, also SIZE is a statistically significant explanatory variable. 
Finally, using NCSKEW as the dependent variable, Adjusted R-Square values are 0.014 for 
the pharmaceutical firms and 0.004 for the pure-play biotechnology firms, and F-values are, 
respectively, 2.2 and 1.2, indicating that the explanatory power and significance of the model 
are slightly higher in case of pharmaceutical firms. The results are in line with the two other 
models. However, both values are low, similar to the main model with NCSKEW, referring 
that the explanatory power and significance of the model are not great. 
Overall, pharmaceutical firms seem to be less prone to stock price crashes than pure-play 
biotechnology firms. However, the explanatory power of the model is higher for 
pharmaceutical firms than for pure-play biotechnology firms, indicating that the set of 
independent variables in the model is better predicting crashes for pharmaceutical firms than 
for biotechnology firms. Further, the significance levels of the models seem to be decreasing 
when restricting the sample, and some changes occur in significance levels of the individual 
independent variables. 
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6. Conclusions 
This thesis examines predictors for stock price crash risk in the biotechnology sector. The 
study is conducted as quantitative analysis applying both logistic and multiple regression to 
explore the predictive power of a set of variables to forecast crash risk. The crash metric of 
Chen et al. (2001) and the metric of Ak et al. (2016) are used in this study, as well as an 
additional crash measure which was created to answer some of the limitations of existing 
measures. The sample consists of biotechnology companies that are in the business of 
developing new drugs (SIC 2833-2836) covering the period from 2002 to 2016. The final 
sample includes 1303 observations from which 823 are pharmaceutical firms and 480 are 
pure-play biotechnology firms.  
In relation to the main objective of this study, the results suggest that return on assets has a 
negative association with future crash risk, and volatility of a stock returns has a positive 
relation with future crash risk in the biotechnology sector. The results indicate that more 
profitable firms in relation to their total assets are less likely to experience stock price 
crashes, and high historical volatility of stock returns is resulting higher likelihood of future 
crashes. Further, to ensure the validity of the individual independent variable results, the 
multicollinearity is taken into consideration. The results imply that also market capitalization 
and size of a firms are negatively associated with crash risk, measured as a likelihood of 
extreme negative returns, indicating that the firms that are larger in terms of market 
capitalization or total assets are less prone to crashes. I suggest that smaller biotechnology 
firms have higher likelihood to experience stock price crashes because they have less 
ongoing drug development projects and hence a failure in one project is more likely to cause 
a stock price crash. 
In relation to the secondary objective, the results imply that the level of consistency between 
the three crash risk metrics is between 70 and 80 percent, indicating that the metrics disagree 
on the definition of a crash or misclassify crashes in 20-30% of the cases. I find that the 
unstandardized crash risk metric created as part of this study and the crash risk metric of Ak 
et al. (2016) have the highest level of consistency, leaving the skewness measure of Chen et 
al. (2001) to have lower consistencies with the other two metrics. The finding is consistent 
with the expectation that the metrics of Chen et al. (2001) and Ak et al. (2016) have 
differences in firm-specific crash classifications due to the distinct definition of a crash. 
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As part of the study, two subsamples, pharmaceutical firms and pure-play biotechnology 
firms, were compared. The results suggest that pure-play biotechnology firms are more 
prone to stock price crashes than pharmaceutical firms. However, the explanatory power of 
the regression model is slightly weaker for pure-play biotechnology firms, indicating that 
the set of independent variables selected to the model are explaining better crashes occurring 
in pharmaceutical firms than in biotechnology firms. 
Further, comparing the results of this study to the prior literature I find that the biotechnology 
industry seems to experience more crashes than other industries on average. However, to 
confirm the suggestion (i.e. to ensure that same methodologies are used and the results are 
comparable), more studies are required. Future research could compare the crash risk 
regression results of biotechnology sector to results of cross-industry sample in order to 
identify more specifically how the determinants of stock price crashes differ between the 
samples. 
This study contributes to the literature and provide practical implications in several ways. 
To my knowledge, this is the first study to research determinants of crash risk in the field of 
biotechnology. The study provides valuable information for managers and shareholders of 
biotechnology firms as well as for investors who are interested in investing to biotechnology 
sector. A better understanding of firm characteristics that predict stock price crash risk can 
be helpful in option pricing, which depends on skewness and crash risk (Hutton et al. 2009). 
Further, as Hutton et al. (2009) suggest, the information of crash risk predictors can be 
utilized in portfolio planning and risk-management applications to mitigate crash risk. 
The study is one of the first efforts, if not the only, to compare firm-specific classification 
of stock price crashes between the different crash risk metrics. Researchers can utilize the 
information when evaluating the validity of the results in crash risk studies. This thesis also 
increase the understanding of the impacts of different crash measures to the results, in respect 
of how they define a crash. 
One of the implications of this study for research includes the new stock price crash risk 
metric created as part of the study. Researcher can utilize the metric as an additional crash 
measure to support the findings of other measures or they can use it as the main measure to 
identify stock price crashes. The new crash metric answers to some limitations of existing 
measures, and hence can match better to the demands of some researchers. 
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Addition to the contributions, this study has some limitations as well. The empirical evidence 
of this study provides information only about the associations between the predictors and 
the crash metrics, not causal connections. Thus, the thesis can only make suggestions about 
the causal connections, and further research is needed to identify the underlying phenomena 
of the results.  
This thesis investigates how well the chosen set of variables can predict future stock price 
crashes. While the empirical results provide information about the association between 
single explanatory variables and future crash risk, the explanatory power of single predictors 
cannot be examined in isolation from other independent variables. Further, this study focus 
on biotechnology sector, and hence the results cannot be applied to other same type of 
industries without further research.  
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables:  
DROP Binary variable that equals 1 when a firm has experienced at 
least one stock price crash during the crash period from May to 
December. 
CRASH The negative ratio of the crash period’s minimum daily return 
to standard deviation of previous period’s daily returns. 
NCSKEW The negative skewness of daily return distribution over the 
crash period from May to December. 
Explanatory variables:  
GOODWILL The ratio of goodwill to total assets. 
GDWLIP Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has done goodwill 
impairments during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Missing 
values of goodwill impairments are replaced with zero. 
XRD The ratio of research and development expenses to net sales. 
MTB The ratio of market capitalization to common ordinary equity. 
logMCAP The common logarithm at market capitalization at fiscal year-
end. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets at fiscal year-end. 
RCF The ratio of change in cash and cash equivalent to shareholders’ 
equity. 
VOLATILITY Standard deviation of daily returns over the previous crash 
period t-1. 
ROA The ratio of net income to total assets. 
LOSS Dummy variable that equals 1 if net income is negative for the 
fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
